Scenario

Combating Anthropogenic Global Warming

Pressure groups in society, for and against certain laws, will lobby the Representatives, who will then pressure the Councillors and the Arbiter 

• While Councillors and the Arbiter will also be lobbied, the lobbyists’ sway on Councillors and the Arbiter will be limited/indirect as only the Representatives carry a ‘stick’ in the Epistocratic system of government with which to hit (or threaten to hit) the Councillors and the Arbiter

• Due to the fact that the Representatives are accountable to their constituents, there will be some Representatives more inclined to favour action on climate change and those more opposed. The Councillors may not feel obliged to act on the issue of climate change because the Representatives themselves may not be united on the issue in order to pressure them to take action
  • Were there consensus in the Chamber of Representatives, the Representatives could effectively agitate for action on climate change 
  • They could make it known to the Arbiter and the Executive Council that they will petition the Arbiter on extraneous issues in a belligerent way to make the cost/inconvenience of inaction on climate change greater and that they would be willing to compromise on certain extraneous laws in exchange for climate action 

• They could base their biannual ratings of the Councillors specifically on their stance on climate change and their action/inaction on the matter
  • They could even vote with 95% support of the Chamber of Representatives to eject Councillors deemed to be obstructing action on climate change  

Since the Representative are not likely to be united enough to force the Councillors’ or the Arbiter’s hands, like with any other political issue, the Councillors will be able to conduct themselves according to their values and agendas 

• There might be tepid, shared motivation within the Executive Council for taking action and they may decide by consensus vote (2/3 majority) to enact some moderate actions to mitigate climate change  – like Obama authorised through the Environmental Pollution Agency – by way of regulations limiting pollution levels for industry, power generation and transportation 

• There may be one or two Councillors who are extremely passionate about the issue and are willing to stake their political future on driving robust legislative action against human-induced climate change. They will work with the Elections and Government Bureaucracy to devise detailed legislation. If they feel that there is not enough support in both the Council and the Chamber of Representatives, they may choose to get several smaller pieces of legislation passed, for example, one piece regarding pollution standards for industry, transportation and power stations or for the funding of renewable energy research and its subsequent adaptation into the economy. If they feel that the Arbiter is onside and that they can ultimately muster the six Councillors necessary to pass the legislation, they may opt to devise comprehensive legislation covering the entire gamut of climate change action to transform the entire economy

• There may be one or more Councillors passionately against taking action for ideological or practical considerations (e.g. not while the rest of the world is dragging its feet on taking action). These Councillors can obviously foil a consensus vote if they number 3 or more. But if they number 2 or 1, they can try to sabotage the efforts of those Councillors who are in favour of action by coordinating their actions with Representatives. They may drive forms of legislation that pay lip-service to action on climate change like funding research on efficient non-renewable energy (such as carbon capture and storage for coal power plants) or even for renewable energy. 

• The Arbiter will have his/her own personal conviction on the issue of climate change that will significantly influence his/her actions. But the Arbiter may suggest compromises between the opposing sides of the issue. He/she may say to the Council that with changes x,y,z to their legislation, he/she will reject the appeal of the Chamber of Representatives. The Executive Council will then have to vote again (2/3 majority) as a response to the 1^st successful appeal by the Chamber of Representatives and then, when the Chamber of Representatives appeals the revised version, the Arbiter will reject their appeal as per his/her agreement with the Council. The legislation will then have overcome all hurdles to its implementation

• There may be Councillors so concerned about the rating that they will receive from the Representatives that they may simply choose to act like the common politician in our current representative democracies. That is, they will determine which position will most likely find favour by the Representatives and stick to it, regardless of what they might truly think about the issue 

Suppose that the Councillors in favour of action succeed in convincing 2/3 of the Executive Council to vote in favor of a specific piece of legislation:

• The Representatives will begin (or will have already begun, depending on how much information has been passed on to them from the deliberations and work of the Executive Council and the EGB in developing the legislation) to find the numbers to appeal the legislation to the Arbiter 

• Leaders of the push to appeal may ask the Arbiter his/her opinion on the legislation to see if they can count on his/her support, or to see on what aspects of the legislation he/she may be willing to accede to an appeal to alter or remove specific elements of the legislation 

• The Representatives’ appeal can be to reject the legislation outright or to reject certain elements. They could appeal certain elements and request that the Executive Council amend certain elements of the legislation. If they succeed in reaching a 2/3 majority to appeal to the Arbiter to reject the entire legislation, the Arbiter may sustain the appeal, but suggest to the Council to amend specific sections of the legislation that he/she finds problematic/objectionable. In this way, the Executive Council can then pass (with 2/3 majority) an alteration to the legislation in line with the Arbiter’s position on the matter and so that when the Chamber of Representatives appeals the revised form of the legislation as not having addressed the demands of their previous appeal, the Arbiter will be willing to reject the second appeal (even though the Representatives’ claim is accurate) and the legislation can go into effect 

• The Elections and Government Bureaucracy may decline to implement the legislation on the basis that it is insufficiently budgeted. The EGB, Arbiter and Executive Council will then negotiate the alterations to the national budget and, if there is agreement among the three parties, the Executive Council will then pass legislation detailing budget changes. Once there is budgetary and legislative clarity and assuming that the Arbiter rejects any appeal made by the Chamber of Representatives, the EGB will diligently implement the global warming legislation.